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Abstract: Online gambling has continued to grow alongside new ways to analyze data using behav-
ioral tracking as a way to enhance consumer protection. A number of studies have analyzed con-
sumers that have used voluntary self-exclusion (VSE) as a proxy measure for problem gambling. 
However, some scholars have argued that this is a poor proxy for problem gambling. Therefore, the 
present study examined this issue by analyzing customers (from the gambling operator Unibet) that 
have engaged in VSE. The participants comprised of costumers that chose to use the six-month VSE 
option (n = 7732), and customers that chose to close their Unibet account due to a specific self-re-
ported gambling addiction (n = 141). Almost one-fifth of the customers that used six-month VSE 
only had gambling activity for less than 24 h (19.15%). Moreover, half of the customers had less than 
seven days of account registration prior to six-month VSE (50.39%). Customers who use VSE are too 
different to be treated as a homogenous group and therefore VSE is not a reliable proxy measure 
for problem gambling. The findings of this research are beneficial for operators, researchers, and 
policymakers because it provides insight into gambling behavior by analyzing real player behavior 
using tracking technologies, which is objective and unbiased. 
Keywords: gambling operators; responsible gambling; voluntary self-exclusion; behavioral track-
ing; consumer protection 
 
1. Introduction 
Through the internet, and especially via smartphones, gambling has changed into an 
activity that can be done anywhere at any time [1]. In fact, in the 2010 British Gambling 
Prevalence Survey, it was reported that up to 14% of the total adult population had gam-
bled online [2] and had increased to 21% in the latest British study [3]. This form of gam-
bling has increased in popularity but can bring about risks for problem gamblers, due to 
the possibility of offering mood-altering experiences such as immersion and escapism, 
which can in turn lead to disproportionate involvement [4]. Online gambling has ex-
panded quickly but gambling regulation to protect players and minimize harm has 
tended to lag behind. Due to the global nature of online gambling, it has become accessible 
across national borders. While gambling regulations were traditionally for territory-based 
gambling, many countries have not got to grips with online regulation of the activity [5]. 
Subsequently, there is a high number of gambling operators based in Malta, in which the 
local authority imposes license requirements for consumers in other countries, making 
borderless gambling possible [6]. 
It is understandable that the more popular online gambling becomes, the more con-
cerning it may be because it might lead to an increase in gambling-related harm [7]. Inter-
net gambling is often seen negatively due to its high accessibility and convenience [8,9], 
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and it may increase the occurrence of problem gambling due to higher gambling exposure 
[10,11]. However, due to factors concerning innovative new technology, better consumer 
protection may be achieved [12,13]. Moreover, online gambling operators may provide 
better and more accessible responsible gambling tools than those provided offline [14–16].  
Responsible gambling and consumer protection have been discussed and defined for 
several years [17]. Criticism lies in the terminology of the words ‘responsible gambling’ 
because the shift of responsibility is placed onto the consumer, where the consumer needs 
to utilize the responsible gambling tools offered by the operator [18]. Further arguments 
have also been raised because there may be a conflict of interest for the operator to invest 
in consumer protection since this might have an impact on the commercial interest and 
financial gain of the operator [19]. Despite this, it can be evident that current legislation 
may impose a financial strain on the operator if responsible gambling interventions are 
not carried out properly and may result in large fines for the operators by regulatory bod-
ies [20]. Gambling may result in harm that is experienced by different social groups such 
as families and communities. Consequently, harm is not only experienced by individuals 
suffering from a gambling disorder [21]. Harms that are common among individuals with 
gambling disorder include escalating levels of gambling that go beyond disposable in-
come, relationship problems with family and loved ones, health problems, and compro-
mising occupation and/or education [22,23].  
Online gambling has provided new opportunities for data to be analyzed for con-
sumer protection purposes [24,25]. This is possible due to the fact that all gambling trans-
actions records are saved and stored for each consumer [26]. Through its online nature, 
online gambling operators may offer different tools such as deposit limits, play limits 
and/or loss limits, which can either be imposed or suggested to the consumers [27]. Re-
search conducted by Wood, Shorter and Griffiths [28] concluded that voluntary self-ex-
clusion (VSE) was one of the highly recommended tools that gambling operators should 
utilize. VSE is a responsible gambling tool that removes an individual’s access to gambling 
with gaming operators [29,30]. In an early study by Smeaton and Griffiths [31], 30 major 
gambling operators were evaluated, and it was reported that only one operator at that 
time had this option available. Due to increased regulatory pressures and an increase in 
importance for consumer protection measure, this has changed markedly. For instance, in 
a study conducted by Bonello and Griffiths [32], 50 major gambling operators were eval-
uated, and VSE was offered by 86% of these operators, a large increase on the study by 
Smeaton and Griffiths [31] in terms of VSE availability. The online gambling industry now 
has the possibility of monitoring and saving customers’ activity data at minimal costs for 
the operator [20,33,34]. Using these tracking data, responsible gambling tools may support 
operators in giving personalized tips and communication to consumers to regulate their 
gambling [1]. Data from online behavioral tracking can be used to assess gambling inten-
sity by players. An initial simulation study by Auer, Schneeberger and Griffiths [35] of 
300,000 gamblers developed ‘theoretical loss’, a metric that can be used to calculate gam-
bling intensity and comprises of the amount of money wagered, multiplied by the proba-
bility of winning on the particular type of gambling activity. This metric was then tested 
on a real customer sample of 100,000 online gamblers using their tracking data. The find-
ings indicated that the theoretical loss metric was robust [36] and has since been used to 
evaluate responsible gambling tools’ efficiency such as limit-setting [37]. 
In another study, customer communication was analyzed to determine whether spe-
cific indicators can be used to predict problem gambling [16]. Here, 1008 emails were an-
alyzed from a group of customers who used VSE and a control group. It was evident from 
the findings that the frequency of customer service communication, and the tonality of the 
written correspondence may be used as a predictor of VSE. An analysis of anonymous 
player data provided by GTECH G2 (an internet gambling software provider) found that 
customers using VSE had greater losses when compared to the control group which did 
not [29]. This study has its benefits because it showed gambling customer activity across 
different operators, but in turn this may also be a limitation because most operators will 
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have more than one gambling software provider. GTECH G2 offers gambling software for 
gambling operators, and therefore this study has its benefits because it showed gambling 
customer activity across different operators. Nonetheless, one gambling operator may 
have multiple gambling software providers, and therefore customer activity can still be 
limited. 
Studies examining behavioral tracking were carried out extensively for a few years 
due to a collaboration with Bwin Interactive. An anonymized data sample of heavily in-
volved gamblers was analyzed by [11]. Although this study possibly shed some insight 
into problem gambling by examining heavily involved gamblers, this approach may be 
limited because not all heavily involved gamblers will be problem gamblers. Problem 
gambling is also dependent on other social and economic factors. Another study from the 
same dataset examined the anonymized tracking data of the first 90 days of a customer’s 
journey with the operator [38]. The results showed that the highest betting activity was at 
the beginning of the player’s journey and that there was an episodic increase in betting 
activity every seven days. Gamblers may have an initial betting activity which is high 
because they may be testing the website and trying new products and features available. 
Another reason may be that there was an acquisition bonus that may have had to be used 
within a specific time period after registration. It is likely that the episodic increase in 
betting activity every seven days is due to the availability of sports events because most 
of them are played at the weekend and therefore betting tends to be episodic based on the 
availability of sporting events that can be bet upon.  
In another study, 2696 gamblers were evaluated by exploring their payment transac-
tions prior to self-excluding [39]. Haeusler proposed that a potential indicator for problem 
gambling was an inconsistency of the amount withdrawn, which fluctuated from very 
high to very low amounts. Although using payment data to build indicators for online 
problem gambling may appear to be a good option, using VSE as a proxy measure for 
problem gambling might not be. This is due to the fact that not all customers choose to 
use VSE because of a problem with their gambling [29,40]. For example, in the aforemen-
tioned study conducted by Haeusler, it was reported that 23.3% of customers that used 
VSE in January 2015 had no deposit payments at all in the year before. This lack of gam-
bling activity may be the result of the gambler being annoyed with the gambling operator 
and consequently wanting to close their account as a sign of their unhappiness.  
In a study by Gray et al. [7], responsible gambling interventions were examined to 
identify possible problem gambling indicators. These interventions included instances 
where players requested to change their money limits, cancelling their withdrawals, and 
fair play complaints, amongst others. This study showed that the players that initiated 
such interventions had significantly more gambling activity across different products [7]. 
A limitation in this sample was that it only included players who contacted customer ser-
vices. Only including players that have initiated these types of interventions excludes 
players that might have had a responsible gambling issue, but were too ashamed, or did 
not want to contact customer services. A better approach was utilized by Xuan and Shaffer 
[41] where they analyzed an anonymized sample from Bwin Interactive of players that 
closed their gambling account online [42]. Consistent with LaBrie and Shaffer [42], the 
study concluded that prior to closing their account, players had increased losses and 
heightened risk-taking. 
VSE has been used as a proxy measure for problem gambling in a number of studies 
[16,42–44]. Although it is very convenient and used in several studies, using VSE as a 
proxy measure for problem gambling may not always be the best approach, especially 
when accounting for online VSE [40]. Although there are several studies that have used 
VSE as a proxy measure of online problem gambling, little published empirical research 
has been carried out on its effectiveness. In a study by Dragicevic et al. [29], it was reported 
that a quarter of all the players that had self-excluded had done this on the same day that 
they opened the online gambling account. It is also unlikely that online VSE has the same 
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 2000 4 of 11 
 
stigma that may be present when self-excluding in a land-based venue, and that gamblers 
may have ulterior motives for choosing VSE. 
Through online behavioral tracking, operators can tailor harm-minimization inter-
ventions [39], which is possible through the objective analysis of large sample sizes [36]. 
As aforementioned, VSE has been used as a proxy measure for online problem gambling 
in several studies. Nonetheless, gamblers who use VSE typically comprise gamblers on 
one part of the gambling spectrum [39]. Moreover, VSE may be used by a gambler as a 
responsible gambling measure, rather than a measure indicating problem gambling [10]. 
A study by Hayer and Meyer [45] found that 26.3% of the gamblers that used VSE had 
chosen to self-exclude because they were annoyed with the gambling operator.  
Providing tailored help and attempting early detection of problem gambling will 
help players to regulate their gambling. This will lead to more sustainable long-term rev-
enue for the gambling operator [44]. By adopting early detection of problem gambling, 
several benefits may be achieved for the gambler and the gambling operator, such as min-
imizing (i) financial harm for the gambler, (ii) potential negative impact on the gamblers’ 
families, and (iii) negative psychosocial impact in the communities where problem gam-
blers live. 
The argument that VSE is not an ideal proxy measure for problem gambling is not to 
be interpreted that VSE should not be offered, but this is an opportunity to better under-
stand the potential misuse of VSE. The aim of the present paper is to evaluate whether 
VSE is a good proxy measure of problem gambling by examining an anonymized sample 
of customers that used VSE. The rationale for using gambling expenditure in this study 
was due to the fact that financial harm is a major issue when it comes to reporting gam-
bling harm. Since this is an initial study looking into this area, the authors have chosen to 
specifically analyze this variable in relation to VSE.  
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Participants and Procedure 
The participants in the present study were all UK customers who chose to use volun-
tary self-exclusion or close their account for self-reported gambling addiction with Unibet. 
These participants were costumers that chose to use the six-month VSE option (n = 7732), 
and those that chose to close their Unibet account due to a self-reported gambling addic-
tion (n = 141). All data were from January 2017 to May 2018. This group of customers 
comprised 80.9% males (n = 6369) and 19.1% females (n = 1504). The majority of the sample 
was aged between 31–40 years (n = 2367; 30.1%) followed by the age group of 26–30 years 
(n = 1903; 24.2%). The age group with the least number of customers was 50+ years (n = 
538; 6.8%), followed by the 18–20 age group (n = 564; 7.2%). 
2.2. Gambling Website Description and Procedure 
The authors were given access to a large anonymized dataset of customers at Unibet 
in order to carry out secondary analysis. This online gambling company offers a range of 
online products, including casino games, poker, sports betting, and in-play sports betting. 
The company also offers a range of responsible gambling tools as part of their commit-
ment to player protection. One of these responsible gambling tools is VSE. The VSE option 
is something that the customers can do on their own and once this is done, the customer 
enters into an agreement that the account is suspended for the period that the customer 
has chosen. The VSE option is always available for the customer to use in their ‘Accounts’ 
section and information and a link to the tool is available on the operator’s dedicated RG 
page. In the case where a customer discloses that they have a self-reported gambling ad-
diction, customer service agents at Unibet raise this issue with the responsible gambling 
department and the account is suspended immediately and permanently. The data col-
lected for these customers were the gambling expenditure by the customer during their 
time with Unibet. The number of days leading to the VSE and closure due to self-reported 
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gambling addiction was also obtained. Analysis of all data was carried out using SPSS 
Version 27. The data were all anonymized so that no customer profiles were identifiable to 
the researchers. 
2.3. Data Analysis 
Descriptive statistics were used to calculate means and percentages. In order to ana-
lyze the differences amongst the groups of customers, t-tests, one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), and effect sizes were calculated using SPSS 23.0. This statistical analysis was 
carried out to examine the gambling behavior prior to VSE, and to compare gambling 
expenditure between those who utilized VSE and gambling expenditure among those 
with self-reported gambling addiction. The significance level for statistical analyses was  
p < 0.01. 
3. Results 
The initial descriptive analysis suggested that most customers that used VSE did not 
have significant gambling activity prior to self-excluding with Unibet. These customers 
might have had activity with other operators, but with this operator, these customers did 
not have significant gambling activity prior to self-excluding. When looking at customers 
who used VSE during this period, the majority of these customers (50.38%) actually self-
excluded in the first seven days of activity. A further breakdown of the gambling activity 
by the time period prior to VSE can be seen in Table 1.  
Table 1. Number of days of gambling activity by gamblers prior to voluntary self-exclusion (n = 
7732). 
Time Period of Activity Prior to VSE Percentage of Customers 
0 days 19.15% 
1–7 days 31.23% 
8–30 days 17.85% 
31–90 days 10.79% 
91+ days 20.98% 
Differences in Gambling Expenditure by Days Leading to VSE Compared to the Addiction Group 
The VSE groups that were split by the number of days of activity leading to the VSE 
in the five time periods (i.e., first day, first week, first month, first three months, and over 
a three-month period) were compared to the customers that closed their account due to 
self-reported addiction (Tables 2 and 3; Figure 1). The total mean gambling expenditures 
were highest for the group that had self-reported gambling addiction, and the lowest was 
for the customers who used VSE in the first day. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was used to examine the effects of days leading to VSE and closure to self-reported addic-
tion on gambling expenditure. There was a statistically significant difference between 
groups as determined by one-way ANOVA (F[5,7867] = 12.144, p < 0.0001). A Tukey post 
hoc test showed that gambling expenditure was significantly different with VSE in the 
first day (200.5 ± 546.3, p < 0.0001), VSE in the first week (305.6 ± 1041.3, p < 0.0001), VSE 
in the first month (362.2 ± 8062.8, p < 0.0001), VSE in the first three months (845.7 ± 3308.8, 
p < 0.0001), and VSE after three months (593.3 ± 2049.4, p < 0.0001), when compared to the 
customers that closed their account due to self-reported addiction (2584.4 ± 9223.4) with 
self-reported gambling addicts spending more money gambling than those who did not 
report gambling addiction across all time groups. 
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Table 2. Total mean gambling expenditure in British pound of the VSE groups and self-reported 
addiction account closure group. 
Group N Mean Standard Deviation 
VSE first day 1481 £200.5 £546.15 
VSE first week 2271 £305.6 £1041.12 
VSE first month 1499 £362.2 £8060.10 
VSE first three months 1274 £845.7 £3307.52 
VSE after the first three 
months 1207 £593.3 £2048.55 
Self-reported gambling 
addiction 
141 £2584.4 £9303.20 
 
Figure 1. Total mean gambling expenditure in British pound by the VSE group and self-reported 
addiction closure group. 
Table 3. The differences in total mean gambling expenditure in British pound of the VSE group and self-reported addiction 
closure group. 
Group 1 Group 2 Mean Difference p-Value Effect Size 
VSE first day VSE first week −£105.09 0.973  
 VSE first month −£161.73 0.890  
 VSE first three months −£645.20 <0.001 * 0.27 
 VSE after the first three months −£392.78 0.131  
 Self-reported gambling  addiction −£2383.93 <0.001 * 0.36 
VSE first week VSE first day £105.09 0.973  
 VSE first month −£56.64 0.998  
 VSE first three months −£540.11 <0.002 * 0.01 
 VSE after the first three months −£287.69 0.357  
 Self-reported gambling  addiction −£2278.84 <0.001 * 0.34 
VSE first month VSE first day £161.73 0.890  
 VSE first week £56.64 0.998  
 VSE first three months £483.47 0.024  
 VSE after the first three months −£231.05 0.689  
 Self-reported gambling  
addiction 
−£2222.20 <0.001 * 0.26 
VSE first three months VSE first day £645.20 <0.001 * 0.27 
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 VSE first week £540.11 <0.002 * 0.22 
 VSE first month £483.47 0.024  
 VSE after the first three months £252.43 0.640  
 Self-reported gambling  
addiction 
−£1783.72 <0.001 * 0.25 
VSE after first three months VSE first day £392.78 0.131  
 VSE first week £287.69 0.357  
 VSE first month £231.05 0.689  
 VSE first three months −£252.43 0.640  
 
Self-reported gambling  
addiction −£1991.15 <0.001 * 0.30 
Self-reported gambling  
addiction 
VSE first day £2383.93 <0.001 * 0.36 
 VSE first week £2278.84 <0.001 * 0.34 
 VSE first month £2222,20 <0.001 * 0.26 
 VSE first three months £1738.72 <0.001 * 0.25 
 VSE after the first three months £1991.15 <0.001 * 0.30 
*significant at the p < 0.01 level. 
4. Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to understand better whether VSE may be used as 
a reliable proxy measure for problem gambling. The main findings showed that the group 
of customers that use VSE is inherently different and not at all homogenous; therefore, it 
is rather limiting to consider it as one group. This varies greatly in terms of the days prior 
to using VSE, highlighting that it might be naïve to place all these gamblers under one 
umbrella. In fact, when looking at the time period of gambling activity prior to VSE, al-
most one-fifth of the sample had no gambling activity prior to self-excluding. Although 
these customers might have gambled elsewhere, on their Unibet account, they registered 
an account and self-excluded. A majority of the sample resorted to VSE within the first 
week of gambling activity (50.38%), which is similar to that reported in other studies 
[39,45]. What is quite evident is that although in previous studies customers who use VSE 
are regarded as one group [16,34,39,46], it is evident that the time period of gambling ac-
tivity leading up to VSE varies significantly. Therefore, gambling operators who use cus-
tomers who have voluntarily self-excluded as a proxy measure of problem gambling need 
to be cautious in using VSE as a potential marker of gambling harm. Customers that use 
VSE within a few days of registering the online gambling account should not necessarily 
be viewed as problem gamblers, and operators should monitor the more gambling-intense 
customers that have gambled on the website for at least a month. The key novelty of the 
present study is that it is the first (i) where the VSE group was split based on the amount 
of gambling activity prior to self-exclusion, and (ii) that customers using VSE were com-
pared to customers that had used VSE but were also confirmed gambling addicts based 
on a self-report to customer services 
The VSE group split in accordance to different time periods (first day, first week, first 
month, etc.) was compared to the group of players with self-reported gambling addiction. 
The differences in the gambling expenditure of each group was significantly different, 
with the self-reported gambling addicts having the largest mean expenditure compared 
to the other groups analyzed. Statistically significant differences were found between the 
customers using VSE in the first day, first week, and first month compared to the custom-
ers using VSE in the first three months. It was also found that the group of customers who 
used VSE in the first three months had a higher mean gambling expenditure when com-
pared to the group of customers who used VSE after the first three months. This was 
mainly due to a small number of very heavy spending gamblers, which increased the 
overall mean gambling expenditure. When looking at the mean differences between 
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groups, it is worth noting that the largest mean differences were present when the groups 
were compared to the self-reported gambling addiction group. It is also worth noting that 
the mean gambling expenditure in the first group was lower than all the other means. It 
might also be concluded that the customers that chose to self-exclude with lesser gambling 
activity prior to using VSE may not have enough gambling activity to be considered in 
the same way as the customers that had a significant amount of gambling activity. Cus-
tomers that experienced self-reported gambling addiction communicated with the gam-
bling operator that they were experiencing gambling problems and/or gambling addic-
tion. These accounts are closed as part of the company’s commitment to responsible gam-
bling and harm minimization. It was expected that if VSE is a good proxy measure for 
problem gambling, then there would be similarities in the gambling expenditure with the 
group of customers that closed their account because of self-reported gambling addiction. 
However, no such similarities were found. 
The findings of the research here are beneficial for operators, researchers, and poli-
cymakers because it provides insight into gambling behavior by analyzing real player be-
havior using tracking technologies, which is objective and unbiased [25]. Better under-
standing of the activity of online gamblers using transaction data arguably provides better 
data on which responsible gambling tools might be best used and offered to online gam-
blers. Given that online gambling websites offer the potential for innovation in responsi-
ble gambling tools [14], such studies are needed in order to actually understand the online 
gambling population. 
When examining the findings as a whole, it appears that a large number of gamblers 
in the sample may have used VSE as a means to close their account for non-responsible 
gambling reasons, especially because these customers had little to no gambling activity 
prior to closing their account. Half of the customer population (50.38%) used VSE in the 
first seven days of opening their account. Based on this finding, it is arguably unreliable 
to use self-exclusion as a possible indicator or proxy measure for problem gambling. 
Online gambling operators and regulators are constantly looking into providing the best 
possible support for gamblers [44], but some online responsible gambling interventions 
appear to be replicas of what is offered in the land-based sector without proper evaluation 
of how or whether such measures would work online. The present study compared the 
group of customers that used VSE with a group of customers that confirmed self-reported 
gambling addiction to customer services. If VSE is a good proxy measure of problem gam-
bling, then there should have been a close similarity concerning gambling expenditure 
with the group that confirmed gambling addiction, since this is based on self-reported 
problem gambling. However, this was not the case. 
This lack of activity prior to VSE activation has also been reported in previous stud-
ies. For example, Dragicevic et al. [29] reported a high percentage of customers self-ex-
cluded within the first 15 days of gambling, including 25% of VSEs within the same day 
of account registration. The possible explanation given was that VSE might have been an 
impetuous decision. VSE online is arguably less shameful, stigmatic, and/or embarrassing 
than VSE in the land-based sector, and it can be done more easily and impulsively for non-
responsible gambling reasons. In the study conducted by Hayer and Meyer [45], it was 
noted that most self-excluders considered the reason for VSE quite spontaneous and that 
a large proportion of the self-excluders did so for non-responsible gambling reasons (e.g., 
due to annoyance with the operator, as a preventive measure or at the request of third 
parties). Another possible reason might be due to the fact that the customer was ap-
proached via promotional email communication, and just wanted to remove access to the 
account that in turn might stop such promotions from being sent. Although there are 
probably customers who self-excluded for responsible gambling reasons, it might be that 
this proportion of the customer base self-excluded more as a rash decision or due to issues 
with the gaming operator. The reason for this is that when comparing the two VSE groups 
with each other, there are clear differences showing that those utilizing VSE are too het-
erogeneous to be treated as a single group. Moreover, when examining the main VSE 
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group and the group that confirmed they had a gambling addiction, the differences were 
significant which further support the notion that VSE may not be the best proxy measure 
of problem gambling. However, the behavioral tracking data in the present study do not 
provide verification for these speculations. Therefore, further research directly asking 
about reasons for VSE is required. 
Further research should examine the group of customers that initiate VSE without 
much gambling activity especially since it is such a significant proportion of the total of 
those who self-exclude within the first week of opening an account. Better understanding 
of the customer base, including self-excluders, would actually help the gambling industry 
in achieving profit without any exploitation of its customers. Research is also needed on 
self-excluders who have little gambling activity prior to self-excluding because these cus-
tomers may be identified and advised in better ways to regulate their gambling, possibly 
by using other RG tools such as limit-setting. In this manner, the operator would be able 
to help the customer retain a sustainable relationship with the operator and not being 
potentially exploited by another operator. Future studies may also include other variables 
to be investigated such as the socioeconomic status of the customers, including the gam-
bling status and more in-depth analysis on different aspects of the gambling behavior. 
Further studies may also examine the different types of gambling activity influence prior 
to VSE, the influence of time, and the impact of direct communication from the operator. 
Other future research could also include comparative analysis between customers using 
VSE and customers that do not. Moreover, the VSE group was split into unequal time 
intervals (i.e., one day, one week, one month, three months) in the dataset provided by 
the gambling operator. These are also typically the time intervals used by gambling oper-
ators for shorter-term VSE options (e.g., many operators provide gamblers with short 
‘cooling off’ periods of one day, one week, or one month). These periods have nothing to 
do with problem gambling but are tools to help players gamble more responsibly. Future 
studies may also consider splitting the VSE group into time intervals that are more equally 
spread (e.g., every week or every month). 
The present study is not without limitations. The data collected only comprised one 
online gambling operator and therefore it is unrepresentative as has been noted by others 
(e.g., [47]). Furthermore, due to the anonymity of internet gambling, the online gambling 
account can be shared with others and the customer may have more than one account [48] 
although the authors believe the number of gamblers that would be doing that in the pre-
sent study would be very low. The participants in the present study might have had sev-
eral online gambling accounts and therefore the activity evaluated may not have shown 
an accurate picture of the total gambling activity by the participant. A further limitation 
is that there was only one group comprising self-reported gambling addicts, whereas the 
VSE group was split into groups who had gambled for different durations. The reason for 
this was that the group comprising self-reported gambling addicts was too small to sub-
divide any further. Future research would benefit from larger samples of gambling ad-
dicts so that they could be examined in terms of different lengths of gambling duration 
like those in the different VSE groups. Despite its limitations, the present study sheds fur-
ther light on how customers’ behavior prior to VSE or prior to closing an account due to 
self-reported gambling addiction occurs. Through the better understanding of customer 
behavior, the gaming operator can engage in using different methods of communication, 
to the possible extent of helping customers refrain from losing too much of their disposa-
ble income, which may correspond to possible harm. Therefore, through this understand-
ing and evaluation of such studies such as the present one, operators can proactively con-
tribute to harm minimization. Harm minimization would have a direct impact on not only 
individuals suffering from gambling disorder, but also on their family and the communi-
ties. 
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